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Abstract
Competitiveness and carbon leakage are major concerns for the design of CO2 emis-
sions permits markets. In absence of a global carbon tax and of border carbon ad-
justments, output based allocation is a third best solution and is actually implemented
(Australia, California, New Zealand). The EU has followed a diﬀerent route; free
allowances are allocated to existing or new capacities in proportion to a benchmark
independent of actual production. This paper compares these two schemes and shows
that the optimal one is actually a combination of both schemes, or output based alloca-
tion alone if uncertainty is limited. A key assumption of our analysis is that the short
term import pressure depends both on the existing capacities and the level of demand,
which is typical in capital intensive and internationally traded sectors. A calibration of
∗We thank Sean Healy, Katja Schumacher (Öko-Institut), Denis Ellerman, Karsten Neuhoﬀ and Christina
Hood for useful discussions and comments on an earlier draft.
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the model is used to discuss the EU scheme for the cement sector in the third phase of
the EU-ETS (2013-2020). This allows for a quantiﬁcation of various policies in terms
of welfare, investment, production, ﬁrms proﬁts, public revenues and leakage.
. JEL Classiﬁcation: D24, L13, H23, L74
Keywords: cap and trade, output based allocation, subsidization of capacity, cli-
mate policy, carbon leakage, competitiveness.
1 Introduction
Nowadays a number of countries have set up their own national or regional Emission Trading
Scheme (ETS) or ambition to do so (Australia, California, China, India, New Zealand...).
The EU implemented its ETS in 2005 and has signiﬁcantly revised the allocation rule for
the period 20132020. In all these designs, the allocation mechanism has been or will be
an important factor of success for their actual implementation.1 This attention comes from
competitiveness and leakage issues and their implications in terms of potential proﬁt loss,
employment, reduced environmental impact due to the transfer of emissions from one country
to the other.
Indeed, the implementation or the lack of implementation of these national ETS will
generate major diﬀerences in the carbon prices worldwide. Internationally traded carbon
intensive sectors may be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by these diﬀerences resulting in production
and investment transfers from high carbon price countries to low carbon price ones. While
border adjustment mechanism may limit these competitive distortions, they are seen by many
emerging countries as indirect protectionist measures incompatible with the philosophy of
the World Trade Organization (Wooders and Cosbey, 2010).
The main approach to circumvent this political constraint relies on output based al-
1See Hood, 2010 for a review of existing and proposed ETS worldwide, and a presentation of their
respective design.
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location (implemented in New Zealand and California, and to be implemented in Australia
if the new majority does not repeal the Clean Energy Future legislation). The EU has
followed a diﬀerent route, free allowances are allocated to existing capacities and new capac-
ities based on an industry benchmark, but without reference to actual production, we refer
to this scheme as capacity based allocation. This paper compares these two schemes. A
major ingredient in the comparison refers to the fact that the scheme is designed ex-ante for
a number of years over which economic conditions may vary. We show that when uncertainty
is large the socially optimal policy is a combination of output and capacity based allocation,
while output based allocation alone is optimal if uncertainty is limited. By socially optimal,
we mean the third-best policy, assuming that neither a global carbon tax nor border carbon
adjustment is feasible.
More precisely, we consider a homogeneous good produced competitively with either
home or foreign plants, both productions emit pollutant emissions. Firms can invest in a
ﬁxed input, capacity, to reduce the home production cost. The home production is subject
to an environmental regulation whereas imports are not regulated. If emissions from home
production are taxed but not the emissions from imports this asymmetry of regulation creates
a positive externality, an increase in the home production having a positive environmental
eﬀect via the reduction of imports. The positive externality associated with leakage calls for
a subsidy on home production additional to the tax on emissions. This is the rationale for
the output based rule of free allocation.
The precise value of the optimal production subsidy is related to the output demand
and if this demand is random or variable but the subsidy ﬁxed, the use of a complementary
policy could be justiﬁed. A subsidy on capacity (i.e. capacity based allocation) could be
justiﬁed to discriminate among demand states. A necessary condition for this result is that
new capacity has a stronger inﬂuence on home production when demand is large and leakage
occurs than when demand is low and leakage does not occur. This condition may be expected
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to hold in a number of energy intensive and trade exposed sectors. Such sectors are typically
capital intensive, capacity decisions are planned over long time horizons, so that capacity
constraints and short term demand levels signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the level of imports.
It is well known that output based allocation has two positive impacts and a negative
one. Firstly abatement incentives remain, secondly by reducing the perceived cost of home
production it preserves a level playing ﬁeld with foreign production unaﬀected by a carbon
price. However, these positive impacts are obtained at the cost of eliminating the output
price signal for consumers so that there is be excessive consumption of products that beneﬁt
from the scheme. The introduction of a social welfare function allows to balance between
positive and negative impacts. This is particularly relevant if in some states of the world
leakage is low so that the regulator would like to have the carbon price signal for consumers
in those states. This calls for a reduction of the production subsidy. If a capacity subsidy
does not aﬀect the home production in case of low demand and reduce leakage in case of
high demand, this will increase the beneﬁts of lowering the production subsidy. However,
investment subsidy has its own negative impact, it encourages over capacity.
Several authors have analyzed output-based allocation scheme. Quirion (2009) provides
an early survey of this literature. Böhringer and Lange (2005) discuss its advantages com-
pared to an emissions-based allocation rule. Böhringer et al. (2010) and Böhringer et al.
(2012) compare it to border tax adjustments and industry exemptions. Fischer and Fox
(2012) and Holland (2012) analyze its eﬀectiveness to address the issues of leakage and
competitiveness. Uncertainty is not discussed in these papers.
Capacity based allocation has received much less attention in the literature. It is related
to the question of reserves for new entrants. The economics of such a scheme has ﬁrstly been
investigated by Ellerman (2008) in the context of the EU electricity market. The analysis
points out that it may have resulted in excess investment in carbon intensive electricity
production. Ellerman also discusses the possible impact of this excessive investment for
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the electricity price giving due consideration to peak and oﬀ peak periods. Other authors
have also discussed how the EU allocation mechanism has inﬂuenced the energy mix in the
electricity industry (see Neuhoﬀ et al. 2006, Zhao et al. 2010, Golombeck et al., 2013).
In our model the demand function and the home productive capacity determine imports,
while the home productive capacity is endogenously determined prior to knowing the actual
demand but knowing the climate policy. Meunier and Ponssard (2014) consider how, in such
a setting, the introduction of a carbon tax at home inﬂuences the short-term (without capac-
ity adjustment) and long-term leakage (with capacity adjustment). In this paper we show
that output based and capacity based allocation schemes are complementary instruments to
maximize social welfare. The idea to distinguish between short term and long term eﬀects
has been recognized in the applied literature (see Ellerman et al. 2010) but remains so far
rarely made explicit in the welfare analysis of allocation schemes. One notable exception
is Fowlie et al. (2012) which considers a Markov dynamic oligopoly model. They adopt a
normative approach and determine the optimal output-based rule. They focus on the inﬂu-
ence of the long-run entry process with imperfect competition while we focus on capacity
investment and demand uncertainty.
We apply our model to the case of the cement industry in Europe. The actual allocation
scheme is modeled as well as the optimal scheme. With our calibration, it turns out that
the optimal scheme is a pure output based scheme, this is so because of the low level of
demand uncertainty relative to the high level of existing capacities. We carry on a sensitivity
analysis which shows that a combination of instruments may be optimal if regulation could
diﬀer among Member States. In coastal Member states the uncertainty relative to existing
capacities maybe higher and the international competitive pressure may also be higher due
to the accessibility of maritime imports.
Section 2 introduces the model. The optimal regulation is determined in Section 3. Two
extensions are also discussed in this section: the possible interaction between the home
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and foreign markets; exogenous versus endogenous emission rates. Section 4 applies our
framework to the case of the EU-ETS scheme for 2013-2020 as implemented for the cement
sector. A simpliﬁed model is used to allow for calibration and a sensitivity analysis. We
compare our optimal scheme to the actual one, as well as to other possible scenarios such as a
pure auctioning scheme or a border tax adjustment scheme. The respective welfare impacts
are derived with the associated levels of investment, production, proﬁt for the ﬁrms, public
revenues and leakage ratios. In the concluding section we discuss the policy implications of
our results for the EU-ETS. We also point out possible extensions for future research.
2 The model
Let us consider a homogeneous good, the demand of which is random. The inverse demand
function is: p(q, θ), where q is the total quantity consumed and θ is a random parameter, with
Eθ = 0,2 distributed over
[
θ, θ¯
]
according to the cumulative distribution F a continuously
diﬀerentiable function. The distribution of θ can represent either risk or time variability of
the demand. We assume that p is decreasing with respect to q and increasing with respect
to θ. The corresponding consumer gross surplus is S(q, θ) with ∂S/∂q = p(q, θ)
There are two technologies to produce this good: a home one and a foreign one. The
home production is denoted qh and the foreign production qf , so q = qh + qf . The foreign
production cost is denoted Cf (qf ); it is increasing and convex with respect to qf . The home
production cost is composed of two components: an investment cost relative to the capacity
choice and a variable cost to production given the capacity. The investment in a capacity k
is proportional to the capacity, ckk in which ck is constant. This investment cost is sunk in
the sense that the capacity k is chosen before the demand parameter θ is known and cannot
be modiﬁed. The variable cost is Ch(qh, k). We consider that Ch(qh, k) is increasing and
2The expectation operator is denoted E.
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convex with respect to qh; it is decreasing and convex with respect to k, and the marginal
production cost is decreasing with respect to k (the cross derivative is negative).
Home and foreign productions generate polluting emissions at respective constant rates
uh and uf , the environmental damage is assumed linear with a marginal damage σ. In a
state θ, the welfare is the diﬀerence between gross consumer surplus and production cost
and environmental damage:
w(qh, qf , k, θ) = S(q, θ)− [Ch(qh, k) + Cf (qf ) + ckk]− σ [uhqh + ufqf ] ; (1)
and, the expected welfare is
W = Eθ [w(qh, qf , k, θ)] . (2)
Environmental damage calls for a regulation of emissions. We assume that home emis-
sions are exogenously priced at σ, the marginal environmental damage, but that foreign
emissions or production cannot be regulated. There is leakage, a decrease in home produc-
tion decreases direct pollution but has the adverse eﬀect of increasing foreign production
and thus creating indirect emissions. This leakage calls for an additional regulation.
For this additional regulation the regulator can only subsidize home production and home
capacity. The subsidy on home production is denoted sh and the subsidy on capacity sk.
We consider a representative price-taking ﬁrm. The timing is the following:
• the regulator sets sh and sk;
• the ﬁrm chooses its capacity k;
• θ is known and the ﬁrm decides how much to produce qh and to import qf .
Several comments should be made on our setting. First, by considering a representa-
tive ﬁrm, we implicitly assume that the foreign plants are owned by home producers. This
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assumption is made mainly for a methodological reason. It allows us to focus on the en-
vironmental incentive to regulate production and to ignore the protectionism incentive to
subsidize home production to reduce the price of imports. Second, we do not consider the
foreign market and the possible change of the foreign consumption induced by the home
regulation. Such a change would indeed aﬀect world emissions and the magnitude of leak-
age. We implicitly assume that foreign consumption is ﬁxed. We discuss the impact of
introducing the foreign market in section 3.2.
Third, the environmental damage is assumed linear, a change of emissions from home or
foreign production does not inﬂuence the marginal environmental damage. The emissions
from the sector under consideration are small compared to total emissions. This is coherent
with the partial equilibrium approach used in this paper.3 Fourth, when interpreting the
model in the context of the ETS, the price σ should be seen as an exogenous price of
emissions permits inferred from the global cap. We suppose that the rates of free allowances
per production unit and per capacity, sh/σ and sk/σ, will not aﬀect the price of permits.
Again, this supposes that the sector under study is small relative to the scope of the ETS
(the emissions of the cement represents approximately a tenth of all ETS emissions). We
discuss directions for relaxing this assumption in the conclusion.
3 Optimal regulation
3.1 Base Case
Let us ﬁrst describe the market equilibrium. The ﬁrm's proﬁt is a function of the market
price:
pi(p, qh, qf , k) = pq − Ch(qh, k)− (σuh − sh)qh − Cf (qf )− (ck − sk) k, (3)
3Note that Fowlie et al. (2012) make similar assumptions on the marginal environmental cost and ignore
the foreign market too.
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from the ﬁrm's perspective the price p is random, the ﬁrm chooses k with a prior distribution
of market prices. Then, for each price realization, it chooses the home and foreign productions
that maximize its proﬁt (3). The ﬁrm's long-term proﬁt is:
Π(k) = E
[
max
qh,qf
pi(p, qh, qf , k)
]
. (4)
We assume that the ﬁrm is price-taker and has rational expectations, its prior distribution
of prices corresponds to the long-term equilibrium distribution p(qh + qf , θ).
In the short-term, k is ﬁxed and the ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt (3). The price clears the
market and the equilibrium productions satisfy the two ﬁrst order conditions
p(qh + qf , θ) = σuh − sh + ∂Ch(qh, k)/∂qh (5)
p(qh + qf , θ) = ∂Cf (qf )/∂qf (6)
if both quantities qh and qf are strictly positive. The home and foreign equilibrium produc-
tions are functions of the demand state θ, the production subsidy sh and the capacity k; they
are denoted as qh(sh, k, θ) and qf (sh, k, θ). It will prove useful to consider foreign production
as a function of home production and the demand state. Therefore, we denote ψf (qh, θ) the
solution of
p(qh + ψf , θ) = ∂Cf (ψf )/∂qf . (7)
At the short-term equilibrium qf (sh, k, θ) = ψf (qh, θ), this notation emphasizes that the
subsidy on home production inﬂuences only indirectly foreign production via its eﬀect on
home production.
In the long-run, the ﬁrm chooses its home capacity by maximizing its long-term proﬁt
(4) and anticipating the equilibrium stream of prices. If the equilibrium capacity k(sh, sk) is
strictly positive it satisﬁes:
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E[−∂Ch(q, k)/∂k] = ck − sk. (8)
The marginal cost of a capacity is equalized with the expected short-term marginal beneﬁt
from a cost reduction. The capacity is null if
E[−∂Ch(q, 0)/∂k] < ck − sk. (9)
The regulator objectives is to maximize the welfare function given by equations (1) and
(2). First, the standard result hold:
Lemma 1 If it is feasible, Welfare is maximized by taxing home and foreign emissions by
σ.
Proof. From the expression of welfare (2), a tax σ on home and foreign emissions would
ensure that the ﬁrst order conditions of (price-taking) ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization coincide
with the ﬁrst order conditions of welfare maximization, for any given k in all states θ.
Therefore, for any k the productions would be optimal. And the k chosen by the ﬁrm would
satisfy (8) with sk = 0, which would also be satisﬁed by the optimal k, and by uniqueness
the two would be equal.
From now on we assume that foreign emissions or production can neither be directly reg-
ulated through a global carbon tax nor through a border adjustment tax. In the remaining
part of the paper, and for simplicity, we shall refer to optimal for the second best policy
whenever neither a global carbon tax nor border carbon adjustment is feasible. The envi-
ronmental cost σufqf is not internalized by producers. In such a case, there is a positive
externality from home production that comes from the reduction of foreign emissions; it
partially oﬀsets the negative externality due to domestic emissions.
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Proposition 1 The optimal couple of subsidies sh, sk satisﬁes:
sh = σuf
−E[∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂sh
]
E[∂qh
∂sh
]
(10)
sk = σufE[−∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂k
]− shE[∂qh
∂k
]. (11)
The proof is in Appendix A. The regulator has to set a positive production subsidy to limit
leakage. The sign of the capacity subsidy is ambiguous and depends on the comparison of two
terms. Before further analyzing these two instruments and the role played by uncertainty, it
is worth considering the benchmark situation without uncertainty.
Corollary 1 Without uncertainty, the production subsidy satisﬁes
sh = −σuf ∂ψf
∂qh
(12)
and the capacity subsidy is null.
Proof. From the equations of Proposition 1, without uncertainty, equation (10) gives
(12); and plugging this equation into (11) gives sk = 0.
Without uncertainty there is no need to subsidize capacity, the subsidy of production
is suﬃcient. The right-hand side of (12) is the marginal beneﬁt from an increase in home
production. This marginal beneﬁt is the product of three factors: the marginal cost of
emissions σ, the foreign emissions rates uf and the sensitivity of foreign production to home
production ∂ψf/∂qh. With this subsidy the positive externality from home production is
internalized by the ﬁrm and there is no need to further subsidize capacity.
With uncertainty the situation is diﬀerent. The sensitivity of foreign production to home
production depends upon the demand state. Consequently, the regulator would like to set
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a subsidy on production conditional on the demand state θ. If the regulator could set a
subsidy sh(θ) in each demand state similar to (12), there would be no need to subsidize
capacity.
3.2 Extensions
The model was kept at a minimal level of complexity to get our result. A subsidy on capacity
might be justiﬁed if demand is random and the regulator can neither tax foreign emissions
nor discriminate among demand states. Several natural extensions are discussed: i) the
explicit modelling of the foreign market and the role of exports and ii) the variation of the
emission rate and the optimal emission price.
Foreign market
The increase of imports from a foreign market has an impact on the foreign market equi-
librium, in particular foreign consumption might be reduced because of an increase of the
foreign price. This adjustment of foreign consumption has an impact on pollutant emis-
sions and a natural question is whether the analysis would be modiﬁed by considering this
adjustment.
The foreign market could be modeled by introducing the foreign consumers' demand and
surplus. The relevant welfare function, for our analysis, would encompass the welfare of the
foreign consumers. The analytical results would be similar, Proposition 1 would still hold
with the diﬀerence that ψf would be the total foreign production instead of the quantity
imported. Indeed, what matters for the analysis of leakage is the eﬀect of home production
on unregulated foreign emissions, and the rationale for capacity subsidies does not depend
on the precise channel through which both are linked.
With a foreign market, the sensitivity of foreign production to home production would be
smoothed by the adjustment of the foreign demand function. Consider two extreme cases: On
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the one hand if the quantity imported from the foreign market is simply subtracted from the
foreign consumption, as would be the case with an inﬁnitely elastic foreign demand, leakage
would be nil and the rationale for either subsidy would be canceled. On the other hand
consider a situation in which the quantity imported does not reduce foreign consumption
and directly increases world emissions. In such a case the foreign price would be constant
and cost convexity could originate from the convexity of the transport costs. For the cement
market considered in the numerical illustration, this latter situation is the relevant one since
imports mainly originate from idle foreign coastal plants (Demailly and Quirion, 2005).
The possibility to export could also be introduced in the framework, and would not
modify the formula of Proposition 1 with ψf being the foreign total production. Exports
would occur when the home demand is low and the foreign demand is large, and imports
in reverse situations, no trade would occur in intermediate situations. Indeed, leakage also
occurs through the reduction of exports. If ﬁrms export in low home demand states, the
discriminatory role of capacity subsidy is reduced. If capacity has a larger inﬂuence on
production the higher the production is, the capacity subsidy would be relatively ineﬀective
to reduce leakage in low demand states in which exports occur but home production is low.
A more complete model would represent N interconnected markets with local demand
and production facilities. The demand on each market would be random and a subset of
the markets would be regulated. Trade would originate from uncertainties and take place
to correct for the local disequilibria between supply and demand. This extension is left for
future research.
Emission price and the emission rate
We have assumed that the emission price was ﬁxed, equal to the marginal environmental
damage, and not endogenously determined by the regulator simultaneously with the couple
of subsidies. A question is whether leakage would justify the implementation of an emis-
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sion price diﬀerent than the Pigouvian level. The answer to this question depends on the
assumption made on the emission rate.
The emissions rate uh was assumed constant, it does not vary with production and
could not be chosen by the ﬁrm. With an exogenous carbon price equal to the marginal
environmental damage, relaxing either assumption would not modify the analysis. This is
reﬂected in the fact that uh does not enter the formula obtained. With a carbon price equal
to the marginal environmental damage, the direct environmental externality is correctly
internalized by ﬁrms and the emission rate would be eﬃciently chosen if such a choice
were introduced. The subsidies are used to correct the leakage externality caused by home
production and not home emission.
If the carbon price were chosen by the regulator, it could be welfare enhancing to distort
the carbon price away from the Pigouvian value if the emissions rate varies with production,
whether it is endogenously set or not. The rationale for such a distortion would be similar
to the rationale for the capacity subsidy: it could be a way to complement the subsidy on
production by indirectly discriminating among demand states. Such a discrimination would
be eﬀective if the carbon price has, in some demand states, an eﬀect on production diﬀerent
from the eﬀect of the subsidy, and this is only possible if the emission rate varies with the
production.
In the numerical illustration, ﬁrms will be able to choose their emission rate. However,
the cost to reduce the emission rate will be assumed proportional to the quantity produced,
an assumption which implies that the emission rate is independent of production.
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4 A numerical application to the European cement mar-
ket
In this section, the model is applied to the EU cement sector.4 We chose this sector because
it features one of the highest CO2/value added ratios (Hourcade et al., 2007), had the highest
emissions of all the manufacturing industry sectors covered by the EU-ETS in phase 1 (2005-
2007; cf. Kettner et al., 2008) and features large demand variations. We use a simpliﬁed
speciﬁcation of the model which allows for the explicit derivation of the optimal scheme. We
abstract from some features of the cement market, such as imperfect competition within the
EU, exports from the EU and geographic diﬀerentiation. We shall come back to the possible
role of these features in the concluding section.
4.1 A simpliﬁed linear quadratic speciﬁcation
The demand is assumed linear with an additive uncertainty, p(q, θ) = a + θ − bq. Home
production can be performed with new and old plants. The old plants have various variable
costs depending on their age, the older plants being more expensive than the more recent
ones. The cost of these old plants is chqo + 0.5γhq2o in which qo denotes the production from
old plants. The new plants have to be built. The cost of a new capacity is ck and the variable
cost of the new capacity is ch. With these assumptions, the variable cost of home production
is:
Ch(q, k) =
 chq if q < kchq + 0.5γh(q − k)2 otherwise (13)
4More precisely, to the EU grey clinker market excluding white cement, which refers to a diﬀerent pro-
duction process and a diﬀerent market.
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New and old plants have identical emissions rates uh.5 This emission rate is the result
of an optimization procedure: ch is a decreasing function of the emission rate uh (a more
pollutant production process is less costly) and the optimal emissions rate uh is the solution
of σ = −c′h(uh). In that case the emissions rate is solely determined by the price of emissions.
Concerning the foreign production, we also consider a quadratic form, i.e.,
Cf (qf ) = cfqf + 0.5γfq
2
f . (14)
It is further assumed that in the situations considered, the price of emissions and the
subsidy on production satisfy:
cf > ch + σuh − sh. (15)
the variable cost of home production with a new capacity is lower than the marginal cost of
the ﬁrst unit imported.
We consider a binary distribution of the demand states θ = θ+ with probability λ and
θ = θ− with probability 1−λ, with θ− < θ+ and λ ∈ (0, 1). For leakage to occur there should
be imports at least in the high demand state θ+. The import cost cf should be suﬃciently
low to ensure that it is the case. Consequently, there are three possible situations depending
on the type of marginal plants in the low demand state. The three situations are depicted
Figure 1. Either the ﬁrm produces less than its new capacity (1(a)), or it produces more
5A recent study on abatement in the cement industry in the EU shows that two factors play a role:
fuel mix and thermal energy eﬃciency of the kiln. New plants do have higher energy eﬃciency than older
ones, but only by a few percentage points, except compared to the very old kilns relying on the so-called
wet technology, which currently only produce 5% of clinker in the EU (Neuhoﬀ et al., 2014, Table 1). The
"semi-wet" technology, which accounts for 7% of clinker in the EU, is only 9% less energy-eﬃcient, and the
other plants are only a few points below the newest ones in terms of energy eﬃciency. Moreover, the fuel mix
is often less carbon-intensive in old plants. As a consequence, plants with the lowest emissions per ton of
clinker are not the most energy eﬃcient, as the European cement association Cembureau has shown on the
basis of an individual plants database (Ecofys, 2009, p. 16). The second factor may depend on investment
since the more recent the kiln the higher the eﬃciency. However the global impact is not so clear since
older plants may provide higher opportunities for abatement with respect to the other factor (Neuhoﬀ et
al., 2014). For simplicity Because this database is not public, we cannot estimate the diﬀerence between
new and existing plants as regards speciﬁc emissions, so we consider in our model that investment has no
inﬂuence on abatement policy.
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and does not import (1(b)), or it imports (1(c)).
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(a) Case A: excess capacity in the
low demand state.
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ch+σuh-sh 
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p 
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(b) Case B: full capacity but no
import in the low demand state.
 
 
θ+
 
θ-
 
cf 
ch+σuh-sh 
  k q  
p 
(c) Case C: imports in both states
Figure 1: The three possible outcomes for the short-term equilibrium with a binary distri-
bution.
Note that the optimal regulation and the type of situation are simultaneously determined.
Corollary 2 The optimal subsidies are:
Case A: If there is excess capacity in the low demand state then:
sh = σuf
b
b+ γf
λ
λ+ (1− λ)RA and sk = (1− λ)sh
γh
b
(16)
where RA = (γh + b
γf
b+ γf
)
1
b
(17)
Case B: If all new capacity is used but there is no import in the low demand state then:
sh = σuf
b
b+ γf
λ
λ+ (1− λ)RB and sk = 0 (18)
where RB = (γh + b
γf
b+ γf
)
1
b+ γh
(19)
Case C: If there are imports in the low demand state then:
sh = σuf
b
b+ γf
and sk = 0 (20)
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The proof is in Appendix (B). A positive capacity subsidy should be implemented only
if the new capacity is not fully used in the low demand state (case A). In that case, an
increase of capacity does not inﬂuence home production in the low demand state whereas
the production subsidy does. The production subsidy is distortive in these states whereas
the capacity subsidy is not. In the other two cases, whether or not imports occur in the
low demand states, the capacity should be null because of a particular feature of the linear
speciﬁcation. With this speciﬁcation, the inﬂuence of capacity on production in the low and
the high demand states is proportional to the inﬂuence of the subsidy on production (the
proportion being γh). Therefore, the capacity subsidy does not have a higher discriminatory
eﬀect than the production subsidy and the optimal capacity subsidy is null. This feature
might not hold with other speciﬁcations.6
Let now look more closely at the expressions of the optimal subsidies in each case. In
case C, imports always occur, and the linearity of our framework implies that the situation is
similar to a situation without uncertainty. It happens when the range of uncertainty θ+−θ−
and the import cost cf are relatively small. In that case the optimal subsidy is equal to
the optimal subsidy without uncertainty. It is the product of the marginal environmental
damage, the foreign emission rate and the sensitivity of imports to the home production.
In cases A and B, imports only occur in the high demand state and the production
subsidy is distortive in the low demand state. The optimal production subsidy is therefore
lower than the no-uncertainty subsidy. Compared to the no-uncertainty subsidy, there is
an additional factor in both cases A and B. This additional factor is the ratio between the
expected eﬀect of the subsidy on production in the high demand states (in which imports
occur) and the expected eﬀect of the subsidy on production in all demand states. The latter
ratio can be interpreted as a measure of the eﬃciency of the subsidy. In case B the subsidy
6For instance if C(qh, k) = q2h/k the eﬀect of capacity on production would be increasing with respect to
the demand state while the eﬀect of the subsidy would be constant and a capacity subsidy could be justiﬁed
even if imports always occur.
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is larger than in case A (RA > RB). In Case B old plants are used, and the convexity of
their cost tends to soften the negative inﬂuence of the subsidy on production (1/(b + γh)).
Therefore, the ineﬃciency of the subsidy in low demand states is lower in case B than in
case A.
It is worth stressing that if the emissions rates of imports and of home production are
close, the optimal rate of free allocation (sh/σ) should be lower than uh, which corresponds
to a full recycling of permits (for the sector considered). It would be lower for two reasons:
because the sensitivity of imports to home production is lower than unity (γf > 0), and
because imports might not occur in all demand states.
4.2 Calibration of the simpliﬁed speciﬁcation and a preliminary
exploration
The calibration is detailed in Appendix B.3. Table 1 summarizes the main parameters.
Parameter Value
Expected demand curve intercept (a) 170 e/t
Additive uncertainty (θ+ & θ−) +/-35 e/t
Probability of the high demand state (λ) 1/2
demand curve slope (b) 0.5 (e/ t)/t
Annualized ﬁxed cost of capacity (ck) 45 e/t
Operational cost of new plants 25 e/t
and of the least costly existing plant (ch)
price of cheapest import (cf ) 50 e/t
Slope of existing plants supply curve (γh) .25 e/t/Mt)
Slope of imports supply curve (γf ) 1 e/t/Mt/)
CO2 price (σ) 20 e/t)
Benchmark for EU free allocation 766kg CO2/t
Speciﬁc emissions home (uh) 758kg CO2/t
Speciﬁc emissions foreign (uf ) 852kg CO2/t
Table 1: Calibration of the simpliﬁed speciﬁcation
Based on this calibration Corollary 2 gives the corresponding optimal policy. It turns out
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that we are in Case C, i.e. the situation is similar to a situation without uncertainty. This is
obviously a special case. It comes from the fact that in spite of the wide variations in the EU
activity level between 2007 and 2009, the level of the EU imports relative to the EU demand
remained relatively low. To get a more comprehensive understanding of our modeling we
now provide a simulation over an extended range of parameters which may correspond the
the situation that occurred in some Member States. This will also allow to put this extreme
case in a broader perspective.
Consider two sets of values for γh and γf , namely the one used in the calibration, γh = 0.25
and γf = 1, and another set in which γh = 4 and γf = 0.25. In this latter set the marginal
cost for old plants is steeper, reﬂecting stronger capacity constraints in old plants, and the
marginal import cost is lower, reﬂecting easier access to sea-haul imports. Hold constant the
demand state θ+ and decrease θ− so that the situation corresponds to case A. Let now the
parameter λ vary in (0, 1). When λ = 1 the situation corresponds to a situation without
uncertainty, which as proved in corollary 2 gives similar results as in Case C. When the
situation corresponds to Case A Figure (2) depicts the optimal policies as a function of λ for
the two couples of cost slopes.7 In both Figures (2(a)) and (2(b)) the optimal policy remains
a combination of output and capacity based except at the extreme when there is no longer
any uncertainty. The output based subsidy is always increasing with λ; this makes sense
because the less likely the imports, the more distortive subsidizing domestic production. The
capacity based subsidy is bell shaped with λ; this also makes sense because there are two
conﬂicting factors, for low values of λ, the social beneﬁt of subsidizing investment is low
because the leakage is small, whereas for high values it is low because one would prefer to
directly subsidize domestic production.
Comparing the two Figures delivers an interesting message. If the marginal import cost
7Detailed calculations show that when λ goes to zero Case A can no longer exist, the situation would
move to Case B and Case C through corner solutions and the optimal policy needs to be adapted accordingly.
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is relatively steep (as it is the case with our calibration) imports almost auto-regulate. The
optimal level of free allocations, either capacity or output based, signiﬁcantly decreases. This
comes from the fact that our objective is not to reduce leakage as such but to maximize social
welfare, with a balance between the beneﬁt of the price signal and the cost of leakage. This
point is overlooked in most discussions. For instance, Fischer and Fox (2012) analyze an
output based scheme which would correspond to sh = σuh. However, Fowlie et al. (2012) do
consider a similar welfare function as in this paper and also get a lower rate for an output
based policy due to an import competitive fringe with a linear supply curve.
This sensitivity analysis suggests stronger leakage protection measures for coastal areas
than in landlocked areas (a point also mentioned in Fowlie et al. (2012)). Indeed the
data associated to Figure (2(a)) may correspond to a coastal member State such as Spain,
which faced large construction booms followed by extreme recessions, and for which we can
imagine that the two parameters γh and γf would be close to those used in Figure (2(a)).
Designing instruments that take into account this important geographic characteristics of
the industry at the European level would be quite challenging, and could open the door to
intra-EU competition distortions. Allocation rules diﬀered across member states in the ﬁrst
two phases of the EU ETS (2005-2012), and the fear of competition distortions motivated
the harmonized allocation rules that the EU adopted for 2013 onwards. Nevertheless, this
would be an interesting policy question to pursue.
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(a) The optimal policy for γh = 2 and γf = 0.
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(b) The optimal policy for γh = 0.25 and γf =
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Figure 2: The inﬂuence of the probability of the high demand state, λ, on the optimal policy.
The rate EU − ETS corresponds to the actual level implemented in the EU-ETS.
4.3 The allocation mechanism in the EU-ETS for 2013-2020 in the
cement sector8
In December 2008, major changes to the EU-ETS were decided, which apply from 2013
onwards (phase III of the EU-ETS). In particular, a majority of allowances are now auctioned.
However, sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage (including clinker manufacturing) continue
to receive free allowances. Every year, the operator of installations in these sectors receives a
number of allowances equal to a benchmark times an activity level. The clinker benchmark
equals 766 kg CO2/t. clinker; it was calculated as the average speciﬁc emissions of the 10%
most CO2-eﬃcient clinker kilns in the EU.
We want to simulate the impact of the phase III design in a future economic context
experiencing a range of uncertainty similar to the one observed in the recent past. The
calibration of the model is made using the past data (2007-2009), assuming that the climate
policy in phases I and II had no inﬂuence on the ﬁrms decisions. The details of this calibration
are given in appendix B.
8This section is largely based on Quirion et al. (2012).
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In our simulation the phase III policy is modelled as follows. For existing installations,
the activity level is the installation's historic production expressed as the median of the
years 2005-08 or 2009-10, whichever is higher. Using Table 1, old plants will receive a credit
allowances of 15e (20 e/tCO2 × 0.766 tCO2/tclinker) per unit of 2007 production.
In order to ensure that free allowances are not allocated to installations which have
subsequently ceased operation, the Directive states that no allowance will be allocated to
installations that have stopped operating. In the event that an installation has only partially
ceased operations, speciﬁc thresholds determine the number of emission allowances that
should be allocated to such an installation. However, if the activity level of an installation
does not drop below 50% of the initial activity level, the installation will still receive 100%
of its allocation. Thus, it is unlikely that this closure rule will have a signiﬁcant impact,
because operators have an incentive to reduce production homogeneously in their plants in
order not to reach the 50% threshold. When modeling the EU policy we assume that the
closure rule in strategically ineﬀective, so free allocation to existing ﬁrms is, economically, a
lump-sum transfer that does not interfere with the investment decision.
For new installations (which includes capacity extensions in existing plants), the free
allowances are provided from the New Entrants Reserve. Given the lack of historical pro-
duction data for new installations, the preliminary allocation of allowances is calculated by
multiplying the benchmark by the installation's capacity (or capacity increase) and a stan-
dard capacity utilization factor. Using Table 1, it amounts to subsidizing investment by 15
e/t which is one third of the investment cost (45e/t).
To sum up, we will model allowance allocation in the EU-ETS as a lump-sum transfer for
existing plants plus free allowances for new installations, proportional to the installation's
capacity.
23
4.4 Scenarios
For completeness we shall consider six scenarios:
1. No-Policy: no climate policy.
2. Auction: full auctioning, auction proceeds are not transferred to the cement sector.
3. NER: New Entrant Reserve, i.e. free allocation for new plants, no free allowances
(i.e. auctioning) for the other plants. Every new plant receives the same number of
allowances per unit of production capacity.
4. EU-ETS: new entrants reserve as in NER plus a lump-sum allowance transfer for
existing plants (cf. section 4.2). The lump-sum transfer is based on the EU-ETS
benchmark (0.766 tonne CO2/tonne clinker) times the production of year 2007 (Table
1) minus the capacity of the new plants associated with this scenario (which substitute
ineﬃcient old plants). The scenarios NER and EU-ETS are identical except for the
distributional outcomes.
5. OBA (Output-Based Allocation): for every tonne of grey clinker produced in the EU,
ﬁrms receive a given number of allowances. The standard academic approach to OBA
is to use as a benchmark the actual emission rate of home plants after abatement
(i.e. 0.758 tonne CO2/tonne clinker, cf. Table 6). This scenario is denoted OBA0.
As we shall prove later on it turns out that our optimal policy (assuming out border
adjustment) would be an OBA policy but with a diﬀerent benchmark (0.284 tonne
CO2/tonne clinker). This scenario is denoted OBA∗.
6. BTA (border adjustment with full auctioning): To be allowed to import into the EU,
ﬁrms have to pay the CO2 price times an adjustment factor. The optimal BTA policy
is based on a benchmark corresponding to the emission rate of foreign plants, assumed
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to be equal to 0.852 tonne CO2/tonne clinker (cf. Table 1). This scenario is denoted
BTA∗.
4.5 Results
We proceed as follows. The optimal policy is characterized, then we compare the various
scenarios in terms of welfare, investment and production, price and revenues, emissions and
leakage.
4.5.1 The optimal policy
As mentioned in section 4.2 our EU calibration corresponds to Case C in corollary 2 (section
4.1). The optimal couple of subsidies satisﬁes:
sh/σ = uf
b
b+ γf
= .284t CO2/t clinker (21)
sk = 0. (22)
This means that the optimal policy is OBA∗. It is a pure output based scheme with a
credit allowance at 5.7e/t clinker. This result is driven by two factors: imports occur in all
states of demand and new plants are always saturated. This explains why capacity based
allocation has no bite.
Second, the actual level of the optimal output based rate is at 5.7e/t clinker (versus
15.3e/t with the EU-ETS). This is quite low and comes from the factor b/(b + γf ) = 1/3
which depends on the convexity of the imports cost and the price elasticity of demand.
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4.5.2 Expected Welfare
Figure 3 depicts the expected welfare variation compared to the No-Policy scenario, in per-
centage. To highlight the discussion, welfare for each class of scenario is drawn as a function
of the allowance allocation or border adjustment per tonne of clinker. As expected, the
welfare maximizing policy is BTA∗. The associated curve is ﬂat on the top so with a lower
adjustment set at the level of the EU benchmark, 0.766 t. CO2/t. clinker, as proposed by
Monjon and Quirion (2010), welfare would be almost as high.
Although less eﬃcient than border adjustment, OBA brings a higher welfare than Auc-
tioning if not too generous, the optimal allocation being for OBA∗. NER & EU-ETS have
the same impact as Auctioning if the allocation rate per tonne of clinker capacity installed
is quite low, because no investment in new plants takes place anyway, which is also the case
under Auctioning. If the allocation rate is higher than 0.204 CO2/t. clinker, new capacity
is installed and the impact on welfare is strongly negative. To sum up, welfare with OBA∗
would be only 0.7% lower than with BTA∗ but 5% higher than with EU-ETS.
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Figure 3: Welfare compared to No-Policy.
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4.5.3 Investment and production
Table 2 gives the investment in new capacity and, for each demand state, production from
new plants and old plants as well as imports. Note that the investment in new plants would
jump from 20 Mt with No-Policy to 79 Mt with EU-ETS or NER, would remain almost
unaﬀected with OBA0 (17 Mt) while there would be no investment with the other scenarios.
The EU-ETS or NER schemes would trigger an over-investment in productive capacity in
Europe (a point emphasized by Ellerman, 2008, for NER in the electricity sector).
No-Policy Auction OBA EU-ETS BTA∗
OBA∗ OBA0 & NER
Investment 20 0 0 17 79 0
Low demand
New plants 20 0 0 17 79 0
Old plants 140 124 133 140 79 133
Imports 10 22 19 11 11 7
Total 170 146 152 168 168 141
High demand
New plants 20 0 0 17 79 0
Old plants 220 204 213 220 159 213
Imports 30 42 39 31 31 27
Total 270 246 252 268 268 241
Table 2: Investment, production and imports in low and high demand states in Mt
4.5.4 Price of clinker, ﬁrms' proﬁts and public revenues
For each scenario and each demand state Table 3 gives the price for clinker, the detailed
proﬁts from new and old plants and from imports. It also gives the public revenues from
permits and the total amount of free allocations. By assumption the expected proﬁt for new
plants is zero (expected operating revenues exactly cover investment cost). The level of free
allocations for old plants for EU-ETS is calculated as the unit carbon price (20 e/t) times
the production of year 2007 (240 Mt) minus the investment in new plants (79 Mt) times the
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EU-ETS benchmark (0.766 tonne CO2/tonne clinker).
Relative to No Policy, on average, ﬁrms' proﬁt increases by 22% with EU-ETS and
decreases by 7% with OBA∗. The price of clinker is lower with NER & EU-ETS than with
OBA∗. This is so because new capacity creates a larger supply, a mechanism which is stronger
than the increase in supply of existing plants generated by the output-based allocation with
OBA∗. As expected there would be almost no changes with OBA0. BTA∗ would lead to
signiﬁcant price increase and proﬁts decrease (due to the price signal). Qualitatively these
results are in line with the literature. The important thing to note is the very substantial
increase in ﬁrms' proﬁts with EU-ETS relative to OBA∗ (+22% vs -7%) obtained through a
decrease in public revenues of e3 billion (- 1433 Meversus 1.644Me).9 The negative ﬁgure
for public revenue in the EU-ETS scenario should not be interpreted as direct subsidies to
the cement sector, but as the value of the allowances sold by the cement industry to other
sectors (mainly electricity).
4.5.5 Emissions and Leakage
A standard criterion used in the literature to compare policies is the leakage-to-reduction
ratio, or leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions in foreign countries divided by the
decrease in emissions in the EU. The results are given in Table 4. The ratio reaches 22%
under Auctioning, less than the values obtained by Demailly and Quirion (2006) as well as by
Ponssard and Walker (2008) but more than those obtained by Monjon and Quirion (2011a,
2011b). With BTA∗ the ratio is negative (i.e. foreign emissions decrease). This negative
leakage rate also appears in many other simulations of border adjustments (cf. Demailly
and Quirion, 2008, for cement, or Branger and Quirion, 2014 , for a meta-analysis of recent
studies beyond cement). The explanation is that less clinker is exported into the EU than
under No-Policy.
9With a completely diﬀerent methodology, Martin et al. (2012) found an overcompensation of e6.7 billion
for all sectors covered by the EU-ETS.
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No-Policy Auction OBA NER EU-ETS BTA∗
OBA∗ OBA0
Low demand
Price (e/t) 60 72 69 61 61 61 75
Proﬁts (Me) from
- old plants 2450 1913 2227 2450 775 3995 2227
- new plants -200 0 0 -170 -788 -788 0
- foreign plants 50 244 178 60 59 59 28
Total proﬁts 2300 2158 2404 2341 46 3266 2255
Public revenue 0 1876 1265 0 1181 -2039 2151
Free allocation 0 0 758 2122 1207 4427 0
High demand
Price (e/t) 80 92 89 81 81 81 95
Proﬁts (Me) from
- old plants 6050 5188 5696 6050 3149 6369 5696
- new plants 200 0 0 170 788 788 0
- foreign plants 450 886 754 480 476 476 377
Total proﬁts 6700 6073 6450 6700 4412 7632 6074
Public revenue (Me) 0 3088 2024 0 2394 -826 3704
Free allocation (Me) 0 0 1212 3335 1207 4427 0
Average
Proﬁts old plants (Me) 4250 3551 3961 4250 1962 5182 3961
Proﬁt vs No Policy(%) -16% -7% 0% -54% 22% -7%
Public revenue (Me) 0 2481 1644 0 1787 -1433 2928
Free allocations (Me) 0 0 985 2729 1207 4427 0
Table 3: Proﬁts, Public revenue and Free Allocation
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The comparison between OBA∗ (19%), EU-ETS (3%) and OBA0 (4%) suggests that
OBA∗ performs poorly. But this comparison would be misleading! Indeed, as reported
in Table 4 the level of CO2 emissions arising from EU consumption (including imports) is
lower with OBA∗ (156 Mt) than with EU-ETS (167 Mt) or with OBA0 (again 167 Mt). This
discussion suggests that the leakage-to-reduction ratio is a bad indicator of the relative merits
of each scenario, with respect to both their eﬃciency and to their environmental impact.10
This will be conﬁrmed by the subsequent welfare analysis.
No-Policy Auction OBA EU-ETS BTA∗
OBA∗ OBA0 & NER
Emissions (Mt)
from domestic
production
172 124 131 149 150 131
from imports 17 27 25 18 18 15
Total 189 151 156 167 167 146
Leakage
ratio (%)
- 22 19 4 3 -5
Table 4: Leakage to reduction ratio and Emissions averaged over each demand state.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides an original setting to analyze the design of allocation schemes for energy
intensive internationally traded industries. When neither a global carbon tax nor a border
trade adjustment is politically feasible, free allocation policies have been considered to mit-
igate leakage and competitiveness issues. Giving due attention to the impact of short term
capacity constraints on the import pressure, our analysis allows for the determination of the
socially optimal combination of output and capacity based allocations.
10The comparison of leakage ratios makes more sense if the abatement in the EU is kept constant across
scenarios. In our partial analysis only emissions related to the cement industry are considered. With an
emissions permits market an increase in the emissions from cement production would be oﬀset by a reduction
of the emissions in other sectors via an increase in the permit price. From a welfare perspective it would
eventually call for a relaxation of the global cap in order to realign the permit price with the emission
marginal cost.
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The case of the EU cement sector is discussed in view of our results. Assuming a range
of demand uncertainty similar to the one observed in the years 2007-2012 and a CO2 price of
20e/t CO2, we conclude that the policy that is to be implemented for years 2013-2020 will
induce a welfare loss of approximately 5% relative to the optimal policy and increase proﬁts
in the cement industry by almost 1 billion euros per year compared to a scenario without
climate policy.
Our model suggests directions in which the current scheme may be improved, such as
going to output based free allocations with a relatively low benchmark. It may be interesting
to introduce industry speciﬁcities such as the oligopolistic structure, the role of geography,
or of multi plant ownership, nor a proper dynamic schedule to allow for the explicit lifetime
of cement plants to test the robustness of our results. A preliminary analysis has been
made regarding the role of geography. In spite of its limitations, we believe that our analysis
brings a valid argument to question the current EU-ETS scheme for 2013-2020. It also points
out the intrinsic diﬃculty of relying on a uniform instrument in an industry in which the
vulnerability to imports is quite heterogeneous across the various European regions.
From a more methodological standpoint we think that our framework could be extended
in three directions so as to enlarge its applicability. First, the analysis may be embedded into
a multi-sector ETS with an endogenous emissions price. The rate of capacity and/or output
based free allocations will aﬀect not only the emissions in the sector directly concerned but
also in other sectors (e.g. the electricity sector). It would be interesting to explore this
interdependence and the eﬀect on the choice of the emissions cap. Second, rather than
being conﬁned to a home market subject to import, we may consider a set of interconnected
markets with local demand and production facilities. In the short term, leakage would
depend on short term demand and existing capacity constraints. Firms would locate their
investment based on national demand trends and national regulations. These investment
strategies might generate a long term leakage, depending on the carbon price and on the
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allocation mechanism. A better understanding of these two forms of leakage would be helpful
to analyze the impacts of existing regulatory policies and design better ones in a world of
asymmetric carbon prices. Third, and in particular with respect to the role of investment,
more general speciﬁcations may be worth exploring.
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Appendix A: Proof of proposition 1
With the expression of expected welfare in (2) written as a function of sh and k, the ob-
jective of the benevolent regulator is to maximize W (sh, k(sh, sk)). The subsidies sh and
sk are used to inﬂuence home production and capacity. The inﬂuence of the subsidy sk on
home production is only indirect via the choice of capacity. There is at least one couple of
optimal subsidies, because W is continuous, bounded and the choice set of subsidies could
be restricted to a compact set. The couple of optimal subsidies satisﬁes the couple of ﬁrst
order conditions:
∂W
∂k
∂k
∂sk
= 0 and
∂W
∂sh
+
∂W
∂k
∂k
∂sh
= 0 (23)
which are equivalent to the couple of equations:
∂W
∂k
= 0 and
∂W
∂sh
= 0. (24)
The problem is therefore similar to the choice of sh and k to maximize W (sh, k).
The derivatives of welfare in a state θ (cf eq. 1) with respect to sh for a given k is, using
the ﬁrst order conditions (5) and (6),
[
∂w
∂qh
+
∂w
∂qf
∂ψf
∂qh
]
∂qh
∂sh
=
(
−sh − σuf ∂ψf
∂qh
)
∂qh
∂sh
. (25)
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Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition is :
E
[(
−sh − σ∂ψf
∂qh
)
∂qh
∂sh
]
= 0 (26)
and the expression (10) follows. Concerning the choice of sk, from the ﬁrst order conditions
satisﬁed by productions, (5) and (6), and by the capacity (8) one gets
∂W
∂k
= E
[(
∂w
∂qh
+
∂w
∂qf
∂ψf
∂qh
)
∂qh
∂k
]
− E
[
∂Ch(qh, k)
∂k
]
− ck (27)
= E
[(
−sh + σuf ∂ψf
∂qh
)
∂qh
∂k
]
− sk (28)
the expression (11) follows.
Appendix B: The speciﬁcation and the proof of Corol-
lary (2)
Appendix B.1: Equilibrium
Let us ﬁrst describe the short-term equilibrium. In a demand states θ, there is a unique
couple of non-negative productions qh and qf such that qh > 0 and p = ∂Ch/∂qh, and,
concerning foreign production, either qf = 0 and p < cf , or qf > 0 and p = ∂Cf/∂qf . This
is so because cf > ch + σuh − sh.
Three situations can occur whether the home production is smaller or larger than k, and
whether the foreign production is positive or null. Given the assumption cf > ch + σuh− sh
there is no import if qh < k. Both productions are increasing with respect to θ so there are
two thresholds θ1 and θ2 such that qh < k if and only if θ < θ1 and qf > 0 if and only if
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θ > θ2.
1. If θ < θ1, qh < k, and p = ch + σuh − sh and
qh = [(a+ θ)− (ch + σuh − sh)]/b. (29)
2. If θ1 ≤ θ ≤ θ2, qh = k, qf = 0, and p = ch + σuh − sh + γh(qh − k) so
qh = [(a+ θ)− (ch + σuh − sh − γhk)]/[b+ γh]. (30)
3. If θ2 < θ, then qf > 0 and p = cf + γfqf so
ψf = [a+ θ − bqh − cf ]/[b+ γf ], (31)
and injecting this expression into the ﬁrst order condition p = ch+σuh−sh+γh(qh−k)
gives
qh =
[
(a+ θ) +
b
γf
cf − (1 + b
γf
)(ch + σuh − sh − γhk)
] [
b+ γh(1 +
b
γf
)
]−1
(32)
The expressions of the threshold states could be found by noting that p(k, θ1) = ch +
σuh − sh and p(qh, θ2) = cf with qh given by the expression (30). These two equations give
an expressions of the thresholds as a function of the capacity. In the long-term the capacity
is endogenous and the thresholds are functions of the parameters.
In the long-run, (if there is a positive investment) the capacity chosen satisﬁes the equa-
tion: λ(p(k, θ−) − ch − σuh + sh) + (1 − λ)(p(k, θ+) − ch − σuh + sh) − ck + sk = 0. There
is a unique solution to this equation (the prices are decreasing w.r.t. k). The average price
should be equal to the long-run marginal cost ch+σuh−sh+ck−sk. The explicit expression
of the equilibrium capacity depends upon the associated short-term equilibriums. There are
38
5 possible situations, two in which the ﬁrm never imports, and the three situations of interest
depicted in Figure (1) in which imports occur in the high demand state θ+.
The following conditions on the import costs cf and the range of uncertainties determine
in which situation the market is, in the long-run (with the equilibrium capacity). It cor-
responds to a situation without regulation (σ = sh = sk = 0) to alleviate notations, the
regulations components can be added to the costs components ch and ck.
• If cf ≥ min
{
ch + (1− λ) γb+γ (θ+ − θ−), ckλ + ch
}
, the ﬁrm never imports and either
produces at full capacity or is in excess capacity in the low demand states (the two
subcases are not detailed here).
• Otherwise, if cf < min
{
ch + (1− λ) γb+γ (θ+ − θ−), ckλ + ch
}
the ﬁrm imports in the
high demand state θ+ and
Case A: if θ+−θ− > ck
λ
(
1 + 1
γh
+ 1
γf
)
− b
γf
(cf−ch), the ﬁrm produces less than its capacity
in the low demand state;
Case B: if ck
λ
(
1 + 1
γh
+ 1
γf
)
− b
γf
(cf − ch) < θ+−θ− < [(ck + ch)− cf ] 1λ
(
1 + 1
γh
+ 1
γf
)
, the
ﬁrm does not import and produces more than its new capacity in the low demand
state;
Case C: if θ+ − θ− < [(ck + ch)− cf ] 1λ
(
1 + 1
γh
+ 1
γf
)
, the ﬁrm imports in both states.
The Figure (4) depicts how the range of uncertainty and the import costs determine in which
situation the market is.
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Figure 4: The diﬀerent cases of Corollary 2 as a function of parameter values.
Appendix B.2: Proof of Corollary 2
We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst determine the sensitivity of imports and the eﬀects of the
production subsidy and of the capacity on the home production Then we use the expressions
of Prospotiion 1.
With the expressions of the home production (29), (30) and (32), and the expression of
the imports function ψf (31) we have the following derivatives:
θ < θ1 θ1 < θ < θ2 θ2 < θ
−∂ψf
∂qh
0 0 b/(b+ γf )
∂qh
∂sh
1/b 1/(b+ γh) 1/ [γh + bγf/(b+ γf )]
∂qh
∂k
0 γh/(b+ γh) γh/ [γh + bγf/(b+ γf )]
Table 5: Expressions of the derivatives in a demand state θ.
• Case A: it corresponds to θ− < θ1 and θ+ > θ2 so from equation (10) and the Table
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(5):
sh
σuf
= E
[
∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂sh
]
/E
[
∂qh
∂sh
]
=
{
(1− λ)× 0 + λ b
b+ γf
/
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]}
/
{
(1− λ)1
b
+ λ/
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]}
= λ
b
b+ γf
/
{
(1− λ)1
b
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]
+ λ
}
= λ
b
b+ γf
1
(1− λ)RA + λ with RA deﬁned by eq. (17)
and concerning the capacity subsidy, ﬁrst note that, in that case, E[−∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂k
] =
γhE[−∂ψf∂qh
∂qh
∂sh
]. Injecting this relationship into equation (11) gives
sk = shE[γh
∂qh
∂sh
− ∂qh
∂k
] = sh(1− λ)γh
b
• Case B: it corresponds to θ1 < θ− < θ2 and θ+ > θ2 so
sh
σuf
= E
[
∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂sh
]
/E
[
∂qh
∂sh
]
=
{
(1− λ)× 0 + λ b
b+ γf
/
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]}
/
{
(1− λ) 1
b+ γh
+ λ/
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]}
= λ
b
b+ γf
/
{
(1− λ) 1
b+ γh
[
γh + γf
b
b+ γf
]
+ λ
}
= λ
b
b+ γf
1
(1− λ)RB + λ with RB deﬁned by eq. (19).
and concerning the capacity subsidy, in that case, ∂qh
∂k
= γh
∂qh
∂sh
. in both demand states
(cf Table 5 ), so, from (11), sk=0.
• Case C: it corresponds to θ+ > θ− > θ2 so (from Table 5)
sh
σuf
= E
[
∂ψf
∂qh
∂qh
∂sh
]
/E
[
∂qh
∂sh
]
=
b
b+ γf
E
[
∂qh
∂sh
]
/E
[
∂qh
∂sh
]
=
b
b+ γf
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and concerning the capacity subsidy, in that case, ∂qh
∂k
= γh
∂qh
∂sh
. in both demand states
(cf Table 5 ) so, from (11), sk=0.
Appendix B.3: Calibration of a No Policy scenario
A No Policy scenario is used as a counterfactual. This scenario refers to a representative
year of the period 2013/2020.11 The demand for that year may be high or low, with equal
probability. Prior to that period the EU cement industry invests in some new capacity. Once
the demand is known, domestic production (from new and old plants) and imports meet the
demand.
This scenario is calibrated using data from 2007 as a high demand year and 2009 as a
low demand year (see table 1 part 1). Since the EU-ETS concerns clinker and not cement
our numerical values are for clinker using the fact that cement is composed of 78% of clinker,
according to the WBCSD CSI GNR database.12
More precisely, we use clinker production from the cement production data provided by
the European cement manufacturer association activity reports (Cembureau 2007, 2009).
There is no publicly available clinker price data (and no publicly available cement price data
at the EU level). We compute a clinker unit value from the UN Comtrade database13 by
dividing the value of EU imports by their volume. This database also provides the volume
of imports. As expected, for the peak year 2007 imports are higher relative to domestic
production than for the recession year 2009, 11% versus 6 %.
The slope of the demand curve is set at 0.5 (e/t)/Mt , which brings a price elasticity of
demand between -0.5 and -1.1, i.e. in the range of published estimates, whatever the state
11An alternative interpretation is to consider that we simulate the adoption of EU-ETS 2013-2020 scheme
in year 2005, and compare it with several other schemes. The No-Policy scenario then corresponds to
what actually happened through 2005 to 2009, under the assumption that the industry had anticipated an
uncertain demand corresponding to the high and low demands of the years 2007 and 2009.
12 http://www.wbcsdcement.org/
13 http://comtrade.un.org/db/
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of demand and the policy scenario.14
The production from new plants is estimated indirectly. Firstly, there is no published
estimate of new clinker capacities since Cembureau stopped publishing plant-level data in
2002.15 Secondly, the amount of new clinker production capacity obviously depends on
the length of the period considered. Hence, the ﬁgure retained (20 Mt of yearly production
capacity during the period considered) should be taken as illustrative. However, it corre-
sponds roughly to the amount of capacity added in the EU 27 in the last ten years during
which Cembureau plant-level data were available, assuming that a clinker kiln has an average
yearly capacity of 1 Mt.
With these data, we run the model backwards with a zero CO2 price,16 in order to ﬁnd
the parameters that are consistent with the above-mentioned data. We proceed in three
steps. Step 1, ch and 1/γh are obtained through supply and demand equations in both
demand states. Step 2, we proceed similarly to get cf and 1/γf introducing imports in these
equations. Step 3, ck is obtained using an expected zero proﬁt condition for investment in
new capacity. The marginal cost of imports increases from 60 e/t to 80 e/t when imports
increase from 10 Mt to 30 Mt corresponding respectively to the low and high demand states.
Investment in new plants generates a total (ﬁxed + variable) marginal cost of 70e/t (45+25)
which corresponds to the average clinker price. Producing 100 Mt through old plants would
generate a marginal cost of 50e/t (25+100/4) and with 200Mt it would be 75e/t.
The values of these calibrated parameters are given in Table 1 part 2.17 The parameters
14 Röller and Steen (2006) estimate a short-run elasticity of -0.46 and a long-run elasticity of -1.47, based
on Norwegian data.
15 Admittedly, the US Geological survey (2011) publishes end-year clinker capacities for France, Germany,
Italy and Spain, but they cannot be directly used for two reasons. Firstly, we have some doubts on their
accuracy because they do not match Cembureau capacity data which were published until 2002. Secondly,
the US Geological survey publishes only end-year capacity, which is increased by plant creation but reduced
by plant closure, with no possibility to disentangle these two eﬀects.
16We abstract from the possible impact from the EU-ETS during those years, given the high level of free
allowances and industry behavior based on average rather than marginal carbon price (Ellerman et al. 2010)
17Note that annualized ﬁxed cost may seem high in comparison to some estimates in the grey literature
(e.g. BCG, 2008, or Exane BNP Paribas, 2006) but they implicitly include a fraction of labor costs, a proﬁt
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given in Table 1 part 3 do not concern the No Policy scenario but the scenarios to be studied,
since they are linked to emissions and abatement. Three important assumptions are made.
Firstly, all EU plants are assumed to have the same speciﬁc emissions,18 and the same stands
for all foreign plants, but speciﬁc emissions of EU and foreign plants diﬀer. Secondly, the
marginal abatement cost curve is assumed to be linear: every extra e/t CO2 brings the
same extra abatement per tonne of clinker. Thirdly, the abatement cost is assumed to be
part of the variable cost, not of the investment cost, which allows a symmetric treatment
of new and existing plants and is a common assumption in the literature. Average speciﬁc
emissions in the EU are taken from the cement sector report which served as a basis to set
the benchmark for free allocation in phase III of the EU-ETS (Ecofys et al., 2009). Average
speciﬁc emissions in the rest of the world are taken from the WBCSD CSI database, and
slightly corrected to be more consistent with our ﬁgure for EU emissions. The CO2 price is
20 e/t. CO2, in line with forecasts for 2020 if the EU GHG target remains at -20% compared
to 1990 (Grubb and Cooper, 2011) and the parameter of the MAC curve is such that this
price reduces speciﬁc emissions by ca. 10%.
margin and all the administrative costs incurred by the authorization procedure to operate a new clinker
plant in Europe.
18Admittedly, some plants emit more than others, with speciﬁc emissions in the EU ranging from ca. 750
to ca. 1150 kg CO2/t (Ecofys et al., 2009). However, accounting for this heterogeneity in our model would
have required heroic assumptions about the correlation between speciﬁc emissions and production cost, since
no such information is publicly available to our knowledge.
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Part 1: Data used for calibration of the No Policy scenario
Variable Value Source
Demand curve slope (b) 0.5 (e/t)/Mt Own estimation
Clinker price 80 e/t UN Comtrade (2007)
(high demand - h.d.)
Clinker price 60 e/t UN Comtrade (2009)
(low demand - l.d.)
Production from existing 220 Mt/yr Cembureau (2007)
plants (h.d.)
Production from existing 140 Mt/yr Cembureau (2009)
plants (l.d.)
Production from 20 Mt/yr Own estimation
new plants
Imports (h.d.) 30 Mt/yr. UN Comtrade (2007)
Imports (l.d.) 10 Mt/yr. UN Comtrade (2009)
Part 2: Parameters calibrated
Parameter Value
Expected demand curve intercept (a) 180 e/t
Standard deviation of θ 35 e/t
Annualized ﬁxed cost of capacity (ck) 45 e/t
Operational cost of new plants 25 e/t
and of the least costly existing plant (ch)
price of cheapest import (cf ) 50 e/t
Slope of existing plants supply curve (γh) 0.25 (e/t)/Mt
Slope of imports supply curve (γf ) 1 (e/t)/Mt
Part 3: Additional parameters used for the other scenarios
Parameter Value Source
CO2 price (σ) 20 e/t Grubb and Cooper (2011)
Benchmark for free allocation 766kg CO2/t E.C. (2010)
in the ETS
Speciﬁc emissions, EU27
(uh for σ = 0)
858 kg CO2/t E.C. (2010)
Speciﬁc emissions, 852 kg CO2/t WBCSD +
rest of the world (uf ) E. C. (2010)
MAC curve slope 0.2 e/ kg CO2† Own estimation
† For σ = 20e/t, the emission rate is uh = 758 kg CO2/t
Table 6: Calibration of the No-Policy scenario and additional parameters
45
